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Helvering v. Horst: Gifts of Income from Property
Jerome M. Hesch* and David J. Herzig**
INTRODUCTION
Helvering v. Horst1 is an early example in the long the line of cases
that have come to stand for the unquestioned principle that if a taxpayer
desires to assign the income from property to another taxpayer, one
must transfer both the “tree” that produces the “fruit” and the “fruit”
itself.2 If one keeps the tree and transfers the fruit, the transferor will
be taxed on the fruit. Other cases reached the same result differently,
holding that the transfer of legal title to the right to income is insufficient to reassign income if the transferor retains the power to decide
who receives the income.3 Despite the view that Horst is broadly applicable, a careful analysis of the facts show this to not be true.
Horst involved a carved-out interest where a father transferred the
right to one year’s income from a bond to his son.4 In 1934 and 1935,
Mr. Horst owned negotiable bonds.5 During each tax year, and shortly
before the strike date of the coupon, the taxpayer detached a coupon
and gave it to his son who cashed the coupon that same year. The issue
in Horst was whether the interest income was taxable to the father or to
the son. The I.R.S. asserted that the interest income was taxable to the
donor, not the donee, and the Board of Tax Appeals agreed.6 The Sec* Jerome M. Hesch is an adjunct professor, teaching courses at the Florida International University Law School, the Graduate Program in Estate Planning at the University
of Miami, the On-Line LL.M. Program at the Boston University Law School and the
Vanderbilt Law School.
** David J. Herzig is a Visiting Professor at Loyola (Los Angeles) School of Law
and a Professor of Law at Valparaiso School of Law.
1 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
2 See I.R.C. § 704(e) (codifying the “fruit-and-tree” metaphor in the context of
family limited partnerships). The original “fruit and tree” metaphor was espoused in
Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 115 (1930).
3 See Comm’r v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 610 (1948) (focusing on the power to control
the payment of royalties to his wife and taxing the royalty income to husband).
4 But see, e.g., Blair v. Comm’r, 300 U.S. 5, 13 (1937) (holding if the assignor has
only a right to collect the income from property, but has no right to the income-producing property itself (the so-called “vertical slice”), the income can be effectively assigned).
5 The top income tax bracket rates in those years were about 63% and the bottom
bracket was under 5%. Tracey M. Roberts, Brackets a Historic Perspective, 108 NW. U.
L. REV. 925, 935 (2014).
6 Horst v. Comm’r, 107 F.2d 906, 907 (2nd Cir. 1939), rev’d, 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
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ond Circuit reversed, holding that the income was properly reported by
the donee.7 The Second Circuit distinguished the Lucas v. Earl8 and
Burnet v. Leininger9 decisions by holding that Mr. Horst passed all control over the payment to the coupon holder.
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit’s decision and held
that the father was taxable on the interest income received by the son,
stating: “[t]he power to dispose of income is equivalent to the ownership
of the income.”10 The Horst case has been widely cited for years for this
simple proposition. The Court’s decision in effect treated the gift as an
income tax realization event.11
It has been quite some time since the foundations of the Horst decision have been thought about or questioned. Many of the problems
scholars had when the case was first decided in 1940 still resonate today.12 Horst is not such a simple decision, and if its theory were extended to its logical conclusion, carve out of the tree could be recast as
assignments of income.13
ANALYSIS
In finding that Mr. Horst was taxable on the bond’s interest income,
the Court first observed that the owner of an interest-paying bond holds
two separate rights: the right to demand payment of the bond principal
at maturity, and the right to demand payments of interest regularly represented by the coupons.14 In order for the Court to require that the
donor report the interest income collected by the son, it treated the gift
7

Id. at 908.
Id. at 907; see 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
9 Horst, 107 F.2d at 908; see 285 U.S. 136 (1932).
10 Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 118 (1940).
11 This anticipatory realization principle has been applied in deciding who should
report gains from the sale of property, commonly referred to as an “anticipatory assignment of income” doctrine to determine whether what was being assigned was the right to
the sale proceeds or an appreciated asset. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Comm’r, 174 F.3d 997,
1006 (9th Cir. 1999) (donor of corporate shares to charity taxable on gain realized by
charitable trust’s sale pursuant to a tender offer and merger agreement made before the
gift in trust).
12 See Edward L Barrett, Income Tax: Taxing Assigned Income under Helvering v.
Horst, 29 CAL. L. REV. 495, 498 (1941); Boris I. Bittker, Charitable Gifts of Income and
the Internal Revenue Code: Another View, 65 HARV. L. Rev. 1375, 1375-78 (1952); Erwin
N. Griswold, Charitable Gifts of Income and the Internal Revenue Code, 65 HARV. L.
REV. 84, 86 (1951); Robert N. Miller, Gifts of Income and of Property: What the Horst
Case Decides, 5 TAX. L. REV. 1, 3, 5 (1949); Traci A. Sammeth, Beyond the Fruit Tree: A
Proposal for the Revision of the Assignment of Income Doctrine—-Caruth Corp. v.
United States, 865 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1989), 65 WASH. L. REV. 229, 234 (1990).
13 See infra note 26.
14 Horst, 311 U.S. at 115.
8
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as an income tax realization event even though it was “plain that the
Court did not intend to alter the settled rule that a gift of appreciated
property does not result in a realization by the donor.”15 The Court
decided that the coupon was “the power to command its payment to
others which constituted an economic gain to him.”16 The majority
opinion then continued “[w]here the taxpayer does not receive payment
of income in money or property, realization may occur when the last
step is taken by which he obtains the fruition of the economic gain
which has already accrued to him.”17 Specifically, the Court explained,
[I]ncome is ‘realized’ by the assignor because he, who owns or
controls the source of the income, also controls the disposition
of that which he could have received himself and diverts the
payment from himself to others as the means of procuring the
satisfaction of his wants. The taxpayer has equally enjoyed the
fruits of his labor or investment and obtained the satisfaction
of his desires whether he collects and uses the income to procure those satisfactions or whether he disposes of his right to
collect it as the means of procuring them.18
Thus, the Court reasoned that the situation in Horst was no different
than the assignment of income cases that had come before it. The Court
basically changed the fundamental understanding of realization (sale or
exchange) to include a subset when a taxpayer “completes the last step
towards satisfaction of his economic gain.”19
Horst could be limited to stand for the proposition that if the taxpayer controls the income-producing property as the income was
earned, the taxpayer cannot assign away the reporting of that income.
However, Horst has been expanded to prevent the taxpayer from retaining the underlying property, e.g., a horizontal slice.20 However, even
after Horst, if the donor gives a vertical slice21 or all rights that the donor possesses,22 then the income follows the property itself.
15 MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN & LAWRENCE ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION:
LAW STUDENT’S GUIDE TO THE LEADING CASES AND CONCEPTS 264 (Foundation Press
13th ed. 2015).
16 Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 115 (1940).
17 Id.
18 Id. at 116-17.
19 See Nick Marsico, Chopping Down the Fruit Tree: Caruth Corp. v. United States
Applies Assignment of Income Doctrine to Gift of Stock between Declaration and Record
Dates, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 845, 852 (1991).
20 But see I.R.C. § 1286(b) (bonds).
21 Taft v. Bowers, 278 U.S. 470, 482 (1929).
22 See Blair v. Comm’r, 300 U.S. 5, 13 (1937); see also supra note 4 and accompanying text.
A
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The fundamental problem faced in Horst is a classic timing question
in the realm of the realization literature. Clearly, when the recipient of
the coupon receives the payment, there is realization of income. Unfortunately, the Court in Horst seems to be caught in the quagmire of its
realization discussion. A gift of appreciated property is not in fact a
realization event by the donor.23
The more plausible explanation of the Horst result is that it hinges
on the continued ability of an income-producing asset’s owner to direct
income generated by the retained underlying property each year. At a
time when income shifting mattered because of significant income tax
rate discrepancies in the progressive rate tables, and no joint returns,
protecting the income tax base would have been a concern. Although
Horst is still the law on horizontal assignments of rents or dividends, as
to bonds, section 1286 uses the bifurcation of income approach. The
baseline used as a starting point for income determination is critical.
Assume Father transfers a bond in trust, directing all income to be
paid to Son for the next 20 years. At end of 20 years, when the bond
matures, the principal is paid to Father who retained the remainder interest in the trust. This scenario is governed by trust law. The assignment of income to Son would be permitted but for the grantor trust
rules. There is no realization event to Father in this scenario. If there is
no realization in this example, why then was there realization in Horst?
CONCLUSION
Applying a practical approach, Horst can be viewed as a decision
that turned on the retention of control over transferred property. Retaining the right each and every year to determine who receives the annual income is the exercise of full dominion and control over that
income, and that is Horst’s true meaning. Recall that the donor gave
away the interest coupon for a single year only and retained the right to
decide who receives the income for all succeeding years. In effect, Mr.
Horst retained the power to decide who receives each subsequent year’s
income. Indeed, “the tax-shifting effort failed in Horst because the donor’s control over the flow of income was so substantial that his prior
ownership [of the coupons] was viewed as continuing despite the gift.”24
As a final thought, putting aside section 1286,25 what if Mr. Horst
gifted all twenty of the annual interest coupons in advance and only
retained the right to bond principal at maturity? The “annual” reten23

CHIRELSTEIN & ZELENAK, supra note 15, at 264.
Id. at 265.
25 Note, Horst is still good law for other carve outs such as the assignment of dividends from stocks and rentals from property.
24
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tion of control analysis was the practical justification for the result in
Horst. However, even relying on the fundamental principle that receipts should be taxable to the recipient who receives the economic benefit of the income,26 the result is not clear in other cases. For example, it
bears further consideration whether annual retention of control over future income – the very justification for the Horst result – is in fact sufficient to cause all transferred income interests to be treated as owned for
income tax purposes by the transferee.

26 See Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404, 412-13 (1940); Thomas v. Perkins, 301
U.S. 655, 662-63 (1937); Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551, 557-59 (1933). Here, owners of
income-producing assets conveyed a remainder interest to another and retained the right
to receive the income. In these cases, the Supreme Court held that the income is taxed to
the recipient. See also Kenneth F. Joyce & Louis A. Del Cotto, The AB (ABC) and BA
Transactions: An Economic and Tax Analysis of Reserved and Carved Out Income Interests, 31 TAX L. REV. 121, 177 (1976) (discussing Perkins and Anderson).

